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Abstract How long shall a country take to learn the world technological
frontier? What would happen if that country found the same difficulties in
learning the true model of its economy? After all, countries catching up often
experience life-changing transformations during the catch-up to a balanced
growth path. We show that an open economy, learning rational expectations
alongside foreign technology, may be characterized by excessive saving and
current account surpluses, as often observed in the data and at odds with
the standard open economy theoretical predictions, and not fully explained
by standard adaptations such as habit formation. Moreover, such a learning
process in a large developing country can upset the savings behavior of a fully
rational expectations advanced country. In a US-China calibration, we show
that this effect can be so strong as to explain important current account imbal-
ances, the savings glut hypothesis, as well as the distribution of factor income.
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1. Introduction
The workhorse neoclassical model makes very clear predictions about the
relationship between the current account and long term or persistent produc-
tivity growth (e.g. Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996). In the face of persistent growth,
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consumption increases in excess of current output and is supplemented by
capital inflows; similar patterns are present for investment decisions, which re-
spond positively to expected future total factor productivity increases. Hence,
lower savings and higher investments should be associated with faster techno-
logical progress. Faster growing economies should be on the receiving end of
international capital flows and these flows should be increasing in productivity
growth.
In spite of these predictions, not only large global imbalances, but also
a negative relationship between persistent economic growth and capital in-
flows has emerged over a longer period starting in 1980s for non-developed
economies: the allocation puzzle (Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2013; Alfaro, Kalemli-
Ozcan, and Volosovych, 2014). This premise relies on three key features that
deserve greater attention. First, the neoclassical model in relation to these
puzzles subsumes perfectly functioning financial markets. Second, analysis of-
ten focuses on a representative agent framework, abstracting from life-cycle
savings motives and demographic structure. Third, it relies on the ability of
agents to rationally forecast the persistent growth component as well as future
marginal utility of consumption.
While many explanations for global imbalances and the allocation puzzle
focus on the first and second points, no model has instead exploited the poten-
tial open economy effects of a slow convergence to rational expectations, quite
natural for an economy undergoing a transition towards a more balanced en-
vironment, and essential to consolidate agents’ knowledge of the true model of
their economy. In the present paper, we incorporate extrapolative expectations
(where agents rely on their more recent experience) into an otherwise standard
small open economy, dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) model that can be
brought to the data. We use a reduced form of learning, where agents forming
expectations are learning to rationally forecast their future marginal utility
and the future marginal product of capital, that is endogenous to the path
of development. When this occurs, we show that a negative pattern between
realized economic growth and capital inflows may emerge that is strengthened
for higher productivity growth, and thus can explain the allocation puzzle.
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This novel channel of persistence can also induce the emergence of global im-
balances between two large regions that we calibrate to the China and United
States.
The basic intuition behind our results is as follows. At the beginning of
a transition to a balanced growth path associated with a higher productivity
level, agents must learn to forecast rationally along with the new model of their
economy. As this occurs, they rely on more recent experience in forming their
expectations. Agents at the beginning of transition tend to overestimate the
extent of their future marginal utility of consumption and the unconstrained
consumer smooths consumption to a new level that reflects the increase in per-
ceived marginal utility of income. Current consumption is therefore too low
and excess saving flows out of the economy. This mechanism is augmented
with higher productivity growth and higher convergence. Our expectational
mechanism is consistent with the well documented positive relationship be-
tween savings and economic growth, but goes a step further in that it offers
an additional channel that supports causation running from economic growth
to savings.
By focusing on the potential of our new channel in a transparent way,
our paper purposefully neglects other important ingredients highlighted in the
literature, which of course matter in the international capital market. Most
notably, in a model of equilibrium global imbalances, Caballero, Farhi, and
Gourinchas (2008a) show that uphill capital flows may emerge as a result of
depressed supply of safe assets in developing economies. Mendoza, Quadrini,
and Rios-Rull (2007) argue that it is a lack of supply for contingent claims in
the presence of idiosyncratic risks and, as a consequence, precautionary savings
motives that can explain current account surpluses of developing countries.
Similar arguments have been made for developing economies on the investment
side.1
1Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian (2007) argue that a lack of financial intermediation
prevents domestic savings from being channeled into productive investments; and Song,
Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2011) model financial frictions which prevent loans from being
allocated to highly productive investment in the private sector as the source of capital
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However, in a panel of developed and developing economies, Gruber and
Kamin (2009) do not find systematic evidence that measures of financial de-
velopment such as credit to GDP ratio or capitalization of stock markets can
explain the direction of observed capital flows.2
Central to the emergence of both imbalances and the puzzling allocation of
capital, is an underlying positive relationship between savings and economic
growth. The work of Carroll and Weil (1993) highlights the causal channel
running from economic growth to household saving, which can be accounted
for in a model of habit formation where agents adjust consumption slowly
(Carroll and Weil, 1993; Carroll, Overland, and Weil, 2000).
At the root of our mechanism is indeed a positive correlation between
saving rate and rate of growth, however, as we document in Section 8, habit
formation is not enough to generate proximity of the model’s predictions to
the data. In other words, the extent of underconsumption observed from many
fast-growing converging economies cannot be sufficiently explained with habit
formation in an open economy model.
Models with an overlapping generation structure may also predict positive
relationship between savings and growth, differing from the standard neoclas-
sical model (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2009). Recent research has focused on the
demographic structure in explaining a feedback loop that allows causation in
both directions. Mehlum, Torvik, and Valente (2013) in a two sector, overlap-
ping generations (OLG) economy, derive the “savings multiplier” of economic
growth that emerges via more redistribution to a young generation of savers
and by increasing the cost of old age care. The model is able to explain why
faster-growing economies exhibit higher saving rates absent any additional
market imperfections.
Further, research in this area highlights implications of the interaction of
economic growth and financial frictions in a life-cycle framework for private
outflows in the Chinese case.
2Furthermore, Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013), point out that the allocation puzzle is
strongest for developing economies that are the most financially integrated (and perhaps
equipped with more developed financial markets).
4
saving. Coeurdacier, Guibaud, and Jin (2012) consider demographic structure
with economic growth differentials and heterogeneous borrowing constraints
in a two country model calibrated for China and the US. Their model is able
to replicate divergence of private savings rates, global imbalances and falling
interest rates, while making predictions for the age-specific savings behavior
in the presence of economic growth.
Our paper relates to a growing literature in macroeconomics that incor-
porates extrapolation bias in order to bring model predictions more in line
with various empirical features.3 De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann
(1990) introduce a model with extrapolative traders that trade in financial
markets along side rational traders; such a model replicates excess volatility,
mean reversion and the equity premium. In addition, the behavioral finance
literature has replicated long-run swings in the stock market as well as the re-
sponse of the market to news, previously unaccounted for in models with ratio-
nal expectations (Barsky and De Long, 1993; Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny,
1998). The introduction of partially extrapolative expectations into macro
models has been shown to match inertia in inflation expectations (Ball, 2000),
unemployment expectations (Tortorice, 2012), house price dynamics (Glaeser
and Nathanson, 2015), and various features of the response to productivity
shocks at business cycle frequencies (Hirshleifer et al., 2015). De Grauwe
(2012) allows agents to switch probabilistically between a rational and extrap-
olative forecasting rule, and shows that complex dynamics and heterogeneous
expectations may result. Fuster et al. (2010) incorporate expectations that
combine rational expectations with a parsimonious, backward-looking fore-
casting rule into a macro model and generate a hump shaped response (inertia
coupled with mean reversion). We take a similar approach that allows rational
expectations to account for an extrapolative bias in expectations, but allow
the bias to diminish over time, representing a reduced form of learning. Fur-
thermore, we use our model to estimate the share of extrapolation and the
3This literature builds on vast empirical evidence documenting the prevalence of extrap-
olation bias. Fuster, Laibson, and Mendel (2010) provide a nice overview of the empirical
literature that documents the prevalence of extrapolation bias.
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learning process in a sample of developing countries.
Although we highlight an expectational mechanism, we view our approach
to be complementary to the friction channels that may affect savings and
investment decisions in developing economies. When agents use more recent
experience to form expectations as transition begins, this represents a market
friction between what is optimal given the true model and what agents judge to
be optimal. This channel operates via a distortion in agents’ optimal savings
behavior. These implications are discussed in greater detail in Section 8.
2. Stylized Facts
Among the empirical facts well documented by the international economic
literature has been the emergence of the global imbalances documented in Fig-
ure 1, which shows current account as a ratio to world GDP for a select group
of economies. Current account imbalances emerge from the mid 1990s and
increase towards the late 1990s after the east Asian financial crisis. For the
United States deficits persist throughout the 2000s, with a significant improve-
ment from 2006 to 2007 and a further improvement after the financial crisis.
Current account deficits do not return to previous levels after the financial
crisis.
The US deficits are matched by current account surpluses from fast grow-
ing, emerging economies on the whole, most particularly developing Asia, oil
producing economies, and former Soviet countries. A sizable current account
surplus arises in most of these economies starting in the late 1990s.
As a consequence of current account imbalances, large (in absolute value)
net foreign asset positions, particularly for the United States and China, have
emerged, shown in Figure 2. This figure shows both the reported net foreign
asset position over GDP from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) and also the
cumulative sum of capital account deficits for the two countries using the
same dataset. Both series are filtered of business cycle frequencies using a
Hodrick-Prescott filter.
The US and China held positions that were relatively small as a percentage
of GDP until the mid-1990s, when current account imbalances between the two
6
Figure 1: Current Account Imbalances
Current account balances are shown as percentage of world GDP for various world regions
from 1995 to 2015. Source: authors’ calculations, WEO Database, IMF
countries emerged. The growth in magnitude of these international investment
positions accelerated into the 2000s and were reduced after the financial crisis.
For the US case, however, the reduction is less pronounced relative to US GDP.
There is robust evidence of a negative relationship between economic growth
and the capital account shown in Figure 3. This figure shows the relationship
between the cross sectional average capital account over GDP and average
trend total factor productivity growth over the period 1995 to 2011 for non-
OECD countries.4
This evidence tells us that not only does capital flow out of fast growing,
developing economies, this relationship is extenuated in faster growing, higher
investing developing economies. This is an extension of the findings of Gour-
inchas and Jeanne (2013) for a sample including transition economies and for
the time period 1995 to 2011.
Our parsimonious model, introduced in the following section, and numeri-
cal exercises, are able to replicate the salient features of the emerged stylized
4The sample of 84 non-OECD countries is the same as that used in Gourinchas and
Jeanne (2013) including transitional economies with available data from 1995. The slope of
the line shown in the graph is -0.45 and is significant at the 5 percent level.
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Figure 2: Net International Investment Position 1995-2011, United States and China
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The solid black and gray lines depicts the net foreign asset position over GDP for China
and the United States, respectively. The dashed lines depict the net foreign asset position
over GDP excluding valuation effects. This series is calculated by taking an initial net
foreign asset position in 1981 (the first series available in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007))
and adding subsequent current account surpluses in the years following. The series is then
smoothed using the Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing parameter, λ = 100. Source:
authors’ calculations, EWN Mark II data from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)
facts introduced above. We provide particular explanation for the imbalances
emerging between the United States and China since the 1990s and the ev-
idence for a negative relationship between productivity growth and capital
inflows over the same period.
3. Model - Small Open Economy
To make our results more transparent, but without loss of generality, we
use a simple small open economy neoclassical growth model, with inelastic
labor supply and no capital adjustment costs. Since we are interested in long-
run relationship, we focus on deterministic trend growth and abstract from the
stochastic growth component characteristic of the business cycle literature.
The economy is populated by a continuum, normalized to 1, of identical
infinitely lived households who at each time t = 0, 1, 2, . . . value current and
future consumption streams according to the following utility functional:
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Figure 3: Negative Relationship between Average Capital Inflows and Productivity Growth
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Average capital inflows over GDP are calculated as the negative average current account sur-
plus over GDP across countries, smoothing using the Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing
parameter of 100. Average productivity growth is calculated as an average growth rate of
level of TFP measured using the approach outlined in Section 4. The sample is comprised
of 84 developing economies. The slope of the above line is -0.45 and is significant at the 5
percent level. Source: authors calculations using data from PWT 8.1 (Feenstra et al., 2013).
Wt =
∞∑
j=0
βju(ct+j), (1)
where ct denotes per capita consumption, and the one period utility func-
tion is u(ct) =
c1−γt −1
1−γ , where γ > 0 is the inverse elasticity of intertemporal
substitution.
Households are subject to period budget constraint
dt = (1 + rt−1)dt−1 + ct + it − yt, (2)
where dt is the household’s end of period t net debt position, rt−1 is the cost
of international borrowing, yt is per capita income and it is investment per
capita.
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They own physical capital, whose law of motion is
kt+1 = it + (1− δ)kt, (3)
where δ is the depreciation rate of physical capital.
Output of a single good in the economy is produced using the following
technology
yt = k
α
t (ξtht)
1−α, (4)
where ht is inelastic labor supply, and ξt is a labor-augmenting technology
parameter. We normalize inelastic labor supply to ht = 1.5 We discuss the
time path for productivity parameter as a combination of trend growth and
productivity convergence in the following section.
We assume the domestic interest rate, rt is
rt = r¯ + φ(e
d¯t
yt
− d¯
y − 1). (5)
The cost of borrowing is comprised of the world interest rate, reflecting the
marginal product of capital minus the depreciation rate of economies that are
on the balanced growth path, and a spread. The spread is increasing in the
level of average household debt over income, d¯t
yt
, relative to some long term
average, d¯
y
, where φ is a measure of the sensitivity of the interest rate with
respect to debt to income ratio. Notice that while in equilibrium d¯t = dt,
households will take d¯t as given in their utility maximization problem.
As in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) and now standard in the literature,
we incorporate this assumption in order to find a balanced growth path that
does not rely on initial conditions of debt in each country.6 This is a technical
5For now, we analyze the case where countries are allowed to differ only in their tech-
nological advancement.
6Without this closing assumption, the deterministic steady state depends on initial debt
levels. This assumption is shown to be plausible over business cycle frequencies (Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe, 2003). It is important to note that the predictions of our model are not
sensitive to the introduction of various closing methods used in the small open economy
literature, including internal debt elastic interest rate and portfolio adjustment costs. Fur-
thermore, while generally used for business cycle analysis, the fact that the country spread
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reason. However, as it becomes apparent in the quantitative results, the sta-
tionarity inducing assumption operates over the very long run, and impacts
only marginally the dynamics we wish to analyze.7
3.1. Productivity Growth
In the present paper, we analyze how the incorporation of learning to be-
come rational along with the true model of the economy into a standard macro
model impacts the predicted relationship between capital flows and long run
convergence to a balanced growth path.
Growth in the economy is derived from exogenous growth of the produc-
tivity parameter, ξt. We assume the technological frontier grows at exogenous
rate, g∗, which represents the long run, balanced growth rate of the most
advanced economies. We highlight the case of convergence, or the economy
catching up to the technological frontier. We formulate a catch-up parameter
as in Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) as follows,
pit =
ξt
ξ0eg
∗t . (6)
This catch-up parameter measures the growth in the economy over t periods
relative to that of the frontier. With this formulation, we are able to describe
technological convergence in a single parameter, where pit > 1 for an economy
that catches up to the technological frontier, pit < 1 for an economy that is
lagging behind, and pit = 1 for countries growing at the rate of the frontier.
It is important to note, that our model does not rely on full convergence to
the productivity frontier; in fact, the economy may converge to any balanced
growth path.
should be increasing in the debt to GDP ratio finds support in literature on the long run
determinants of country spreads (Kinoshita, 2006; Kumar and Baldacci, 2010)
7For example, one may be concerned that the relative strength of income and substitu-
tion effects with falling interest rates may impact the direction of our results. Our results
are robust to different values of the IES.
11
Rewriting Eq. (6) in terms of ξt and ξt−1 and rearranging,
ξt = e
g∗ pit
pit−1
ξt−1. (7)
The gross growth rate in the economy is comprised of a balanced growth
component and a productivity frontier convergence or catch-up component.
In order to examine the transition of the economy during convergence, we
assume the time path for catch-up,
pit = (1− ψ)pit−1 + ψp¯i, (8)
with 0 < ψ < 1. The economy catches up during a transition to a value of p¯i, to
which the productivity parameter converges. In this sense, one may consider
pit to be the cumulative growth in excess of the frontier.
3.2. Equilibrium
Households choose optimal paths for ct, dt and kt+1 given initial conditions,
d0 = d¯, k0 > 0, taking the path of d¯t as given, and subject to Eq. (2) and the
no Ponzi-game condition,
lim
j→∞
dt+j∏t+j−1
i=t−1 (1 + rt+i)
≤ 0. (9)
The necessary conditions for the above optimization problem are,
c−γt = λt (10)
λt = β(1 + rt)Eˆt(λt+1) (11)
λt = βEˆt
[
λt+1(αk˜
α−1
t+1 + 1− δ)
]
(12)
where k˜t+1 = kt+1/ξt+1 is the capital stock per effective unit of labor, λt is the
shadow price of consumption and where the Eˆt may correspond to the true
conditional expectation for the rational case, or the extrapolative conditional
forecast with learning. Eqs. (11) and (12) are the consumption Euler and
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capital demand equations, respectively. Eq. (10) is the definition of marginal
utility from the CRRA utility function.
The above first order conditions together with Equations (2), (3), (4), (5)
and given k0 > 0 and d0 = d¯ describe the dynamical system completely.
3.3. Expectation Formation
The transitional dynamics during productivity convergence are largely de-
termined by agents’ expectations of future marginal utility of consumption
relative to expected future return on savings and investment. Given the key
role for the forward looking behavior of agents in the model, the assumptions
on the formation of expectations on future variables are central to the dynamic
predictions of the model.
The standard rational expectations assumption imposes very strict require-
ments on the computational ability of agents in the model. While we follow
this approach in the stable environment of advanced countries, we instead as-
sume that in countries experiencing a transitional path, agents are unable to
compare the rational expectations predictions perfectly and, when calculating
hypothetical variations, rely on their more recent experience.
We find this experience-based cognitive bias plausible in the absence of the
balanced growth path. In fact, in our small open economy model the economy
begins transition with a technological growth displaced away from balanced
growth. When labor-augmenting technological progress begins its convergence
process, agents in the economy must learn to use the rational expectations
forecast along the transitional path to balanced growth. In such a situation, we
find it natural to assume that agents may not trust their marginal predictions
about their future will to consume and supplement forecasts based on the true
model of the economy with purely extrapolative beliefs, forming a forecast of
future marginal variables that is a convex combination of forecasts based on
the true model and one that extrapolates on past values.
Within this framework, we postulate that the representative household’s
forecast at time t for their future marginal utility λt+1 is
Eˆtλt+1 = µtλt−1 + (1− µt)Etλt+1, (13)
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where, µt is the share of the household’s marginal utility forecast that is purely
extrapolative. Technically speaking, we assume that they cannot correctly
evaluate derivatives at values of the endogenous variable different from their
past period’s value, that is, for any function F of a time sequence {xt}∞t=0 we
define:
Eˆt
[
dF (xt+1)
dxt+1
]
≡ µtF ′(xt−1) + (1− µt)F ′(xt+1), for t = 2, 3, ...
Hence they correctly evaluate the functional form of F , but partially evaluate
it at the wrong point, xt−1 instead of xt+1. Of course Eˆt requires knowledge
of ct−1 and µt, which is available at time t.
Notice that the resulting expectation Eˆt distorts only period t + 1 com-
ponent of the rational expectations functional. However it includes the fully
rational expectations functional in case µt = 0.
Similarly, expectations on the marginal productivity of capital– on the
right hand side of the capital demand Eq. (12) – are formed according to
Eˆt
(
λt+1(αk˜
α−1
t+1 + 1− δ)
)
= µtλt−1(αk˜α−1t−1 +1−δ)+(1−µt)Et
(
λt+1(αk˜
α−1
t+1 + 1− δ)
)
.
(14)
As a first step, we assume that µt evolves according to the reduced form
autoregressive process,
µt = ρµµt−1 + (1− ρµ)µ¯. (15)
where the share of extrapolation that agents use in their marginal forecasts
converges to µ¯.
Assumption 1. In the steady state, forecasts approach the fully rational fore-
cast. µ¯ = 0.
We assume agents are becoming fully rational at a rate given by (1− ρµ).8
8One could allow agents to form “nowcasts”, or assume agents may observe perfectly
the current state of the economy. Agents using current period forecasts do not significantly
change the results presented here, but change the shape of the transition slightly.
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As a consequence, the weight of extrapolation in the forecast converges from
above to 0. This reduced form assumption for the evolution of µt represents a
gradual learning of agents to forecast true marginal values of the economy, as
they converge to the balanced growth path.9
With this formulation, in an estimation exercise we allow the data to deter-
mine the speed at which agents in the model converge to rationality. We could,
alternatively, assume a fixed share of extrapolation in the forecast. However,
we prefer this formulation so as not to force persistent extrapolation bias.
Quite interestingly, the estimation returns a very persistent learning process.
With the incorporation of the forecast for λt+1, the dynamical system is
completely described by,
λt = β(1 + rt)[µtλt−1 + (1− µt)Etλt+1] (16)
λt = β
[
µtλt−1(αk˜α−1t−1 + 1− δ) + (1− µt)Et
(
λt+1(αk˜
α−1
t+1 + 1− δ)
)]
(17)
together with Eqs. (2), (3), (4), (5), (15).
We remark that we are not assuming different preferences, but only differ-
ent computation abilities of marginal values when the economy is off steady
state.
4. Quantitative Exercise
In a deterministic setting, we simulate the full technological convergence of
the Chinese economy to the frontier, both for the standard rational expecta-
tions model and for the case with learning. As we will see later, our results hold
for convergence to any balanced growth path and across developing economies.
China is clearly not a small open economy but has, with little doubt, been at
the forefront of intrigue regarding the savings glut hypothesis and studies of
excess saving during periods of high economic growth. We perform an identi-
cal exercise (with essentially identical results) for a two region case in Section
7.
9The reduced form process for µt is easily micro-founded with adaptive learning.
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We find the case of China particularly well-suited to study our expectation
channel, which operates during productivity convergence by slowing consump-
tion growth. China has experienced very high productivity growth, averaging
4.8 percent from 1995 to 2011, while at the same time has exhibited high
and rising household savings rates (Chamon and Prasad, 2010; Kraay, 2000).
Furthermore, the fast economic growth stands in contrast to earlier periods of
economic turmoil and slow economic growth, particularly just after the rev-
olution, represented most by the Great Famine from 1959 to 1961, in which
16.5 to 45 million Chinese perished (Meng et al., 2015).
The backward looking expectation of marginal utility of consumption dis-
torts the representative family’s belief about their future will to consume.
We view a common Chinese saying particularly reflective of this mechanism,
oft-repeated by older generations upon the start of acceleration in economic
growth: “neng chibao duzi jiu keyi le” or, “a full stomach is enough” (Ma
and Adams, 2014). Despite the promises of higher economic growth, and con-
sumption that would accompany it, particularly the Chinese having experience
with the Great Famine may exaggerate future subsistence needs. This is in
line with recent evidence by Chen and de la Rupelle (2016) that finds in Chi-
nese counties hit more severely by famine, household saving is higher by about
five percentage points, an effect that operates through endogenous response of
preferences.
Along the balanced growth path, at the frontier, the technology parameter,
ξt, grows at an exogenous rate, g∗. Productivity convergence to the frontier is
characterized by the catch-up parameter, pit, that reaches a steady state level
once convergence is attained.
Total factor productivity is computed using an approach common in growth
and development accounting literature.10 Namely, from our production func-
tion
ξt =
(
yt
kαt
)1/(1−α)
, (18)
10See Chu and Cozzi (2016) for a growth accounting exercise in the case of endogenous
technological change.
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where yt and kt are real GDP and capital stock per employed labor from PWT
8.1. Our measure for TFP is the trend component of ξt, using a Hodrick-
Prescott filter with smoothing parameter of 100.11 The growth rate of the
frontier is proxied by the long run, growth rate of trend total factor produc-
tivity in the United States of 0.016 from 1995 to 2011.
By construction, after full convergence the Chinese TFP growth should
equal that of the US or frontier and therefore, p¯i
pi0
=
ξ∗0
ξ0
. Normalizing pi0 to 1
and taking the ratio of our measure of US TFP to Chinese TFP, we calibrate
p¯i ≈ 11.18. This parameter measures the initial distance to the productivity
frontier.
The model is calibrated to annual data. The number of years that it takes
the economy to converge to the frontier is governed by Eq. (8) and specifically,
parameter ψ. From 1995 to 2011, Chinese trend TFP grows from 3, 960.80 to
8, 546.70, a factor of 2.16. From Eq. (8), we have after 17 years, the value of
the catchup parameter pi17 = 1.68. Plugging this into Eq. (8) for t = 17 we
can solve for ψ = 0.0043.
The world interest rate, r¯ is taken as the interest rate along a balanced
growth path: r¯ = (eg∗)γ/β − 1. Considering the frontier growth of 0.016, and
assuming a subjective discount factor in the utility function of β = 0.96, this
gives us a world interest rate of 5.81 percent, which is slightly lower than the
value taken in Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) and the long-run average return
on capital markets as measured for developing countries of 6.9 percent (Caselli
and Feyrer, 2007).
The remaining parameters are taken from standard values in the literature
cited in Table 1. We assume a positive rate of depreciation of 6 percent, a
capital share of α = 0.3 and an inverse elasticity of substitution parameter γ
11The real GDP measure corrects for changing reference prices and PPP exchange rates
over time and, as such, is comparable across countries and over time. We use the real GDP
measure based on output side, the variable rgdpo, which takes into account the relative prices
in exports and imports in addition to final goods in the calculation of PPPs over time. This
will give a better measure of productivity changes over time, as it accounts for the affects
of changing terms of trade on real GDP measure. We find this of particular importance in
a sample, which includes emerging economies.
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of 1.12 The parameter governing the elasticity of the interest rate with respect
to average debt to GDP ratio φ is set to 0.035. This is in line with estimates
of the sensitivity of country interest rates to debt to GDP ratios found in the
literature (Kinoshita, 2006; Kumar and Baldacci, 2010).13
The initial share of extrapolation in the forecast and the speed of learn-
ing are latent. We estimate µ0 and ρµ using a simulated method of moments
approach, that minimizes the sum of squared distance between our model’s
predictions for current account balance over GDP and the empirical coun-
terpart in China taken as trend current account over GDP from Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2007) from 1995 to 2011. This estimation exercise results in
an estimated µ0 = 0.426 and speed of learning of ρµ = 0.999. The transitional
path of µt is displayed in Figure 4.
The simulation begins at time t = 0, for the productivity catch-up by
assuming an initial balanced growth path at a low initial productivity level
relative to the frontier. At t = 1, convergence begins and total growth in the
economy rises from 1.016 to in excess of 1.06. Figure 4 shows the transition
of productivity growth and productivity catch-up.
The model’s predictions for NFA position over GDP, current account and
trade balance over GDP, capital stock over GDP and the interest rate are
shown in Figure 5. The figure shows Chinese data for the empirical counter-
parts to the model in the gray dashed line.14
12Our assumption of log utility is not essential for our results. With γ > 1, the substi-
tution effect is dominated by a negative income effect, resulting from falling interest rates,
which exacerbates our results. With log utility, we are able to isolate the effects from our
expectational channel and a positive wealth effect.
13A value of φ = 0.035 means for a 1 percentage point increase in the debt to GDP ratio
for China, interest rates increase around 3.5 basis points. This is consistent with estimates
in the literature of the elasticity of country interest rates with respect to debt to GDP
ratios, that long run country interest rates increase 2 to 7 basis points with an increase of
one percentage point in debt to GDP ratio (Kinoshita, 2006; Kumar and Baldacci, 2010).
14The trade balance to GDP ratio is taken from the World Bank’s external balance of
goods and services as a percentage of GDP and the NFA over GDP and current account
over GDP series calculated from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) EWN Mark II database.
Capital stock is taken from the real capital stock from PWT 8.1 and the interest rate is
taken as the Chinese deposit rate from IMF’s International Financial Statistics. All series
are detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing parameter 100. The NFA
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Table 1: Parameters used for simulation
Calibrated Parameters
Frontier TFP growth rate g∗ 0.016 PWT 8.1
Initial convergence parameter pi0 1.00 normalization
Final convergence parameter p¯i 11.18 PWT 8.1
Speed of tech. convergence ψ 0.0043 PWT 8.1
Parameters from literature
Depreciation rate δ 0.06 Caselli and Feyrer (2007)
Capital share of income α 0.30 Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013)
Discount factor β 0.96 Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013)
CRRA parameter γ 1.00 log utility
Steady state debt/GDP ratio d¯ 0 full repayment of debt in long run
Interest rate sensitivity φ 0.035 Kinoshita (2006); Kumar and Baldacci (2010)
Estimated parameters
Initial share of extrapolation µ0 0.426 estimated by simulated method of moments
Speed of learning ρµ 0.999 estimated by simulated method of moments
Final extrapolation share µ¯ 0 rational agents along balanced growth path
The predictions of the neoclassical open economy–and rational expectations
model–are well known. From an intertemporal perspective, forward looking
agents in a country experiencing rapid technological convergence should bor-
row from abroad to increase current consumption in excess of current output.
Therefore, absent any capital market frictions, we would expect there to be an
immediate deterioration in the trade balance to GDP ratio, which recovers over
time as output catches up to consumption. The rational expectations (RE)
model’s transition is shown in the solid black line and the adaptive learning
version in solid gray line. In the RE case, we observe a transition in the trade
balance as expected: there is an initial deterioration in the trade balance,
which is corrected over time, as the output growth catches up to the optimal
consumption path.
Our model with learning during convergence, with the presence of ex-
trapolation in the expectation formation, conveys a very different prediction.
over GDP is absent valuation effects and taken as the cumulative sum of current account
surpluses plus initial NFA position in 1980.
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Figure 4: Share of Extrapolation, Simulation of Productivity Convergence
The solid lines above depict the transitional dynamics of the main driving parameters in the
simulation. The left panel shows the movement of the proximity to frontier, given in Eq.
(8). The halfway point to convergence is achieved, given the estimation of ψ = 0.0043 after
around 150 years. The center panel shows the evolution of the share of extrapolation in the
forecast for future marginal utility of consumption and marginal product of capital. The
first order difference equation given in Eq. (15). This process is very slow moving, given an
estimated parameter of ρµ = 0.999. The third panel depicts the TFP growth factor in Eq.
(7).
Quickly after the start of convergence, large trade surpluses emerge, rising to
a maximum of around 5.5 percent of GDP after about 7 years, then falling
thereafter, but remaining positive until 15 years after the start of convergence.
Thereafter, trade deficits emerge that are persistent and more reflective of the
RE predictions. We observe large net foreign asset positions relative to GDP
emerging in this economy that reach 40 percent of GDP about 15 years after
transition begins.
This excess saving is confirmed in the fact that consumption to GDP ratio
falls after the start of convergence in the learning model. This effect is quite
strong. In fact, in the presence of extrapolative expectations, in a converg-
ing economy, the expectation for future marginal product of capital would be
lower, due to a lower capital stock per capita at the beginning of convergence.
Indeed, we observe that the capital stock increases in the learning case, reflect-
ing higher investment. However, this is not enough to overturn the implication
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of excess saving on the external account.
Figure 5: Small Open Economy Results, Chinese Data
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The solid, black line depicts the small open economy transition with rational expectations.
The solid, gray line depicts the transition with extrapolative expectations. All simulated
variables are in levels. The gray, dashed line depicts data for China from 1995 to 2011. All
data is in levels and filtered using Hodrick Prescott filter with smoothing parameter 100.
The predictions of our model are very consistent with the data for China.
The simple small open economy model, with parameters estimated directly
from observables, is able to replicate the magnitude of observed trade balance
over GDP of 4 percent almost exactly. Furthermore, the shape and magnitude
of NFA over GDP in our model is highly reflective of the emergence of large
a NFA position that has grown to 30 percent of GDP in China since the
mid 1990s.15 The simulation results for the main variables of our small open
economy model are shown in Figure 16 in Appendix A.
15It is worth noting that the interest rate falls after convergence begins. While this is
mechanically due to the formulation of the interest rate being debt elastic, this is consistent
with evidence of falling rates of return to capital in China during the 1990s that increase
thereafter (Bai, Hsieh, and Qian, 2006).
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5. Welfare Effects
How important is the excess saving that results during convergence for
welfare? We compare the consumption equivalent changes in welfare during
productivity convergence with rational expectations versus our model with
learning.
From (1), household’s time t welfare during convergence can be rewritten
in equilibrium as
Wt =
∞∑
j=0
βj [ln(c˜t+j) + ln(ξt+j)] ≡ W˜t +
∞∑
j=0
βj ln(ξt+j), (19)
where c˜t+j ≡ ct+jξt+j denotes productivity-adjusted consumption, and W˜t de-
notes the present discounted utility of productivity adjusted consumption.16
In a balanced growth path, productivity-adjusted consumption is a constant,
c˜t+j = c˜, and (19) becomes
ln(c˜)
1− β +
∞∑
j=0
βj ln(ξt+j) ≡ W˜ +
∞∑
j=0
βj ln(ξt+j) (20)
The welfare equivalent steady state productivity adjusted consumption
level, c˜, is obtained by equating W˜ = W˜t, and getting
c˜ = exp((1− β)W˜t). (21)
Therefore, by comparing the productivity adjusted consumption levels for
the value of welfare in the rational expectations case and the learning case,
we are able to evaluate the impact of varying expectation formation on the
welfare of convergence.
With the same parameters taken in the quantitative exercise in the previous
section, the presence of extrapolation in the forecast for the marginal utility
of consumption reduces welfare to the equivalent of reducing consumption by
16It can be proven that
∑∞
j=0 β
j ln(ξt+j) is a finite positive constant.
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about 3.5 percent–reducing consumption per effective unit of labor from 1.18
to 1.14.
6. Two Country World - Global Imbalances
In order to explore global imbalances in the context of our model, we recast
the basic economy in terms of a two large economy model.
In the two country model, we assume two countries, Country A, a large
industrialized country, and Country B, a large developing economy and ana-
lyze the interactions of these two economies during convergence to a balanced
growth path. Country A is assumed to be at the frontier and Country B con-
verges to the balanced growth path of the frontier. As such, the industrial
economy grows at the long run rate of growth of the frontier, g∗. The devel-
oping economy catches up to the frontier and grows at a rate, gt > g∗, during
convergence.
Productivity evolves in Country A,
ξAt = e
g∗ξAt−1 (22)
and in Country B,
ξBt = e
g∗ pi
B
t
piBt−1
ξBt−1. (23)
The structure of the model is the same in each country apart from the
following additional assumption.
Assumption 2. Agents in an economy growing along the balanced growth path
are fully rational. µA0 = 0.
As before, in the learning case, we assume that agents form their expectations
based on a convex combination of extrapolative expectation and rational ex-
pectation of the marginal utility of consumption. Learning takes place during
catch-up as agents learn to forecast the true model of the economy. Given this
assumption, the expectation formation for Country A at the frontier is purely
derived from the true model of the economy and the learning case is present
only in Country B.
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The risk premium applies only to the case of Country B so that the interest
rate at which Country A may borrow is rAt , whereas Country B’s cost of
borrowing is determined by a risk premium related to the level of debt over
GDP relative to some average, d¯,
rBt = r
A
t + φ(e
d¯Bt
yBt
− d¯
y − 1). (24)
Our choice of which country pays (receives) the positive (negative) premium
does not affect the quantitative results in any calibrations.17
In addition, each country, i = A,B has the production function,
yit = k
i
t
α
(ξith
i
t)
1−α. (25)
Capital evolves in each economy according to,
kit+1 = i
i
t + (1− δ)kit (26)
We assume that households maximize the same expected lifetime utility
function as Eq. (1) subject to a budget constraint,
dit = (1 + r
i
t−1)d
i
t−1 + c
i
t + i
i
t − yt. (27)
Households in each country i choose cit, dit, kit+1 subject to Eq. (27), taking
as given the path for d¯Bt and given initial conditions, kA0 > 0, kB0 > 0 and
dA0 , d
B
0 . The first order conditions for each country in the adaptive learning
case are
17We have also tested whether rebating the premium back to Chinese households impacts
our results. The impact is negligible.
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cAt
−γ
= λAt (28)
cBt
−γ
= λBt (29)
λAt = β(1 + r
A
t )Et(λt+1) (30)
λAt = βEt[(λ
A
t+1)αk˜
A
t+1
α−1 + (1− δ)] (31)
λBt = β(1 + r
B
t )[µtλ
B
t−1 + (1− µt)EtλBt+1] (32)
λBt = β
[
µtλ
B
t−1(αk˜
B
t−1
α−1 + 1− δ) + (1− µt)Et
(
λBt+1(αk˜
B
t+1
α−1 + 1− δ
)]
(33)
To close the model, we impose a market clearing condition for international
debt,
dAt = −dBt (34)
since Country B can only borrow from abroad, the net foreign assets of country
B must be equal to the net foreign liabilities of Country A.
As a consequence of the previous equation, the goods world market clearing
condition holds:
cAt + c
B
t + i
A
t + i
B
t = y
A
t + y
B
t . (35)
Eqs. (28)-(33) together with Eqs. (25), (26), (27), (24), (35), (34), (22) and
(23) together with kA0 , kB0 > 0 and dA0 = dB0 = d¯ describes our two-country
world.
7. Global Imbalances
In our two country model, we simulate again a transition for the Chinese
economy converging towards the productivity frontier. We perform an iden-
tical exercise to that in Section 4. The parameters used in the simulation
exercise are listed in Table 2.
The interest rate along the balanced growth path is, rUS = (eg∗)γ/β − 1.
With frontier growth of 0.016, and assuming a subjective discount factor in
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Table 2: Parameter Values for two-country simulation
Parameters both Countries
Depreciation Rate δ 0.06
Capital share of income α 0.30
Frontier growth rate g∗ 0.016
Discount factor β 0.96
CRRA parameter γ 1.00
Steady state debt/GDP ratio d¯ 0
Parameters for China
Final convergence parameter p¯i 11.18
Speed of tech. convergence ψ 0.0043
Initial share of extrapolation µ0 0.464
the utility function, β = 0.96. This gives us an interest rate along the balanced
growth path of 5.81 percent, which is consistent with slightly higher interest
rates in the US around the start of our productivity convergence in 1995, which
decrease (along with world interest rates) over time (Caballero et al., 2008a).
The main results for the US and China for this exercise are shown in Figures
17-18 in Appendix A. Figure 6 shows the main results for the simulation using
Chinese data. The rational expectation model (the solid, black line) predicts
an initial trade deficit over GDP as China transitions to higher technology,
consumption will increase above current output produced with the given capi-
tal stock. As the result of this debt-financed consumption in excess of output,
China would be accumulating debt, generating a negative net foreign asset
position.
If agents are tempted to rely more on their more recent experience in form-
ing expectations of future marginal utility of consumption, a very different
prediction materializes. A trade surplus emerges in the initial stages of conver-
gence. Consumers tend not to trust the ability for future economic growth to
enable them a sustained higher level of consumption and thus under-consume
relative to output. This trade surplus persists for about 15 years before re-
turning to a deficit, more consistent with rational expectation model.
During initial convergence, excess savings is channeled abroad to US debt
and Chinese net foreign assets over GDP expands quite significantly in excess
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Figure 6: Quantitative Results, Chinese Data
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The solid, black line depicts the two large economy model results with rational expectations.
The solid, gray line depicts the transition for the extrapolative expectations model. The
simulated data are in levels. The dashed, gray line depicts data for China from 1995 to
2011. All data is filtered using a Hodrick Prescott filter with smoothing parameter 100.
of 45 percent of GDP after around 15 years of catch-up. Interestingly, the
positive NFA position takes quite some time to unwind and Chinese net foreign
assets remain positive well into transition.
The two-country model replicates well the size and evolution of NFA po-
sitions over GDP observed in the data–for both the Chinese and US cases
shown in Figures 6 and 7, respectively. Our model offers an important predic-
tion for global imbalances should China continue its transition: as consumers
in China learn to forecast the true model of technological convergence, the
imbalances that have been at center stage of policy and academic debate since
their emergence, will tend to disappear. China’s consumers will learn to fore-
cast economic growth in the economy and imbalances will tend to diminish
as they catch-up to rational expectations and the balanced growth path of
frontier economies.
With the exception of capital stock over GDP in the US, our model repli-
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Figure 7: Quantitative Results, US data
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The solid, black line depicts the two large economy model results with rational expectations.
The solid, gray line depicts the transition for the extrapolative expectations model. The
simulated data are in levels. The dashed, gray line depicts data for United States from 1995
to 2011. All data is filtered using a Hodrick Prescott filter with smoothing parameter 100.
cates not only the current account to GDP ratio in China, which was targeted
in the estimation of µ0 and ρµ, but also other variables. Particularly notewor-
thy is the ability of the expectational channel to capture both the magnitude
and time path of variables describing the Chinese economy during transition.
8. Discussion
In addition to the stylized facts that we can explain with our simple model,
there are several larger implications from our findings. These are discussed in
turn.
8.1. Evidence Across Countries
Our results are not isolated to the miraculous growth experience in China
used in our simulation, but accommodate the diverse convergence experiences
of developing economies. Figure 8 shows the model’s predictions for average
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current account over GDP for the first 20 years of convergence for varying
TFP growth values and initial extrapolation shares, keeping remaining model
parameters fixed at the calibrated Chinese values. For large enough values of
the initial extrapolation share, as the extent of convergence increases, countries
with extrapolation in their expectation formation experience greater capital
outflows.
Figure 8: Average Current Account over GDP by Varying TFP Growth and Extrapolation
Share
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The three dimensional surface plot above depicts our small open economy model’s predic-
tions for average current account over GDP for varying levels of initial share of extrapolation
in the forecast and TFP growth factor. All other parameters are kept at values estimated
for China shown in Table 1. At values of initial extrapolation share below 0.43, the slope
of the curve between TFP growth factor and average current account surplus over GDP is
small in magnitude and negative. At values above 0.43, the slope turns positive and begins
to increase in magnitude. This is due to the dominance of the investment channel over the
consumption channel during initial years after convergence for countries further away from
the frontier.
The non-monotonicity of the surface in Figure 8 results from two different
channels of capital flows during technological convergence. First, a country
very far away from the technological frontier, requires a higher amount of in-
vestment in order to converge to a higher steady state level of capital per
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effective worker. In the learning model, firm’s expectations of future marginal
product of capital are higher due to the extrapolation bias and investment is
higher than in the rational expectation case. Second, households in the con-
verging economy have higher expectations of future marginal utility of con-
sumption and therefore, consume less than in the rational expectations case. If
the consumption channel dominates the investment channel, we see increasing
current accounts over GDP as the technological convergence increases.
In our quantitative exercise of productivity convergence, initial forecasts
are comprised of about one half extrapolative and one half rational expecta-
tions forecast, reflected by an initial µ of 0.426. The emergence of current
account surpluses do not rely on a high value of this parameter specific to the
Chinese case. Figure 9 shows the model’s predictions for the average current
account to GDP ratio over the first 20 years of convergence. Current account
surpluses may emerge with an initial weight of extrapolation in excess of 0.30,
given a high convergence parameter of 11.18. Interestingly, the threshold µ0
for which surpluses emerge is increasing in the convergence parameter and any
presence of extrapolation increases the current account surplus predicted by
our model relative to the rational expectations benchmark.
How do these model-simulated results reconcile with real development ex-
periences of other countries over the same time period? We conduct our es-
timation exercise for µ0 and ρµ for a sample of 50 converging, non-OECD
economies with data available from 1995 to 2011, using the same simulated
method of moments estimation as the baseline simulation introduced in Section
4.18 A detailed discussion of this exercise as well as the estimated parameters
are presented in Appendix B.
Figure 10, shows the results of the cross-country simulation exercise. Panel
(a) shows a positive relationship between the average extrapolation share in
forecast and average productivity growth from 1995 to 2011. Countries that are
growing faster during convergence, and therefore initially further away from
18We choose the sample period 1995-2011 for consistency with the Chinese experience,
however, the results of this exercise also hold for the sample period 1990-2011.
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Figure 9: Average Current Account over GDP with Varying Initial Share of Extrapolation
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0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
Average Current Account over GDP
This figure depicts the average current account surplus over GDP for varying levels of initial
extrapolation share. All other parameters are kept at values estimated for the Chinese
economy listed in Table 1. For an initial distance to frontier given for China, there are
increasing capital inflows in the initial extrapolation share. Thus, our distortion is positively
related to capital inflows for a given extent of convergence. This graph results if we consider
a vertical plane from the x-axis in Figure 8 at the growth factor for China at 1.048. The
positive relationship holds for all values of TFP growth factor.
balanced growth, tend to rely more on past experience when forming their
expectations. The average share of extrapolation is calculated from simulated
µt from Eq. (15). It is a function of both the initial share of extrapolation and
the speed of convergence to rational expectations, (1− ρµ).
Panel (b) shows the empirical counterpart to Figure 9 using data across
countries. Not only are higher extrapolation shares associated with higher TFP
growth factors, but also greater capital outflows during convergence. Thus our
mechanism appears to be able to explain, at least partially, the cross-sectional
allocation of capital across converging economies.19
19Interestingly, the positive correlation between the extrapolation share and current ac-
counts over GDP are not solely driven by current account surpluses, but also for those
economy who exhibit smaller deficits than the neoclassical growth model with rational ex-
pectations would predict. This is consistent with Rothert (2016), who finds that a large
share of the allocation puzzle can be explained by the smaller magnitude of capital flows
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Figure 10: Cross Country Evidence, 50 Converging Economies
Share of Extrapolation, Average 1995-2011
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TFP Growth, Average 1995-2011
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panel (c)
Results of an estimated model with extrapolative expectations are shown for a sample of
50 developing economies that are converging to the world technological frontier. Panel (a)
depicts a positive relationship between the average current account surpluses over GDP
and average share of extrapolation in the forecast over the simulation period. Panel (b)
shows a strong positive correlation between the average share of extrapolation and average
TFP growth. Panel (c) depicts the empirical positive relationship between average current
account surpluses over GDP and average TFP growth. The average share of extrapolation
is taken as the longitudinal average of the share of extrapolation over the simulation period
from Eq. (15).
Finally, panel (c) reiterates our extended evidence of the negative relation-
ship between capital inflows and productivity growth from our stylized facts
for our sample of converging economies: there is a positive relationship be-
tween average current account surpluses over GDP and average TFP growth
from 1995 to 2011.
8.2. Savings and Investment Wedge Analysis
We perform a mapping of our novel distortion in agent’s expectation for-
mation process to a wedge in the agents savings and investment decisions.
We calculate the wedge that results between optimal savings decision and our
savings that varies over time.
instead of the direction.
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Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) perform a similar exercise, in which they
introduce a savings wedge to the Euler equation in an otherwise standard
neoclassical model in the form,
ct
−γ = β(1 + rt)(1− τs,t)Et(ct+1−γ). (36)
This positive (negative) wedge essentially taxes (subsidizes) saving by altering
the expected marginal utility of consumption.
Revisiting our agent’s Euler equation, our distortion on expectation forma-
tion introduces a time-varying wedge that is a function of µt, and a backward
looking component on the marginal product of capital,
c−γt = β(1 + rt)(µtc
−γ
t−1 + (1− µt)Et(c−γt+1). (37)
In order to understand how our distortion might translate into a time
varying wedge of the form in Eq. (36), we run our basic model convergence
exercise to generate a series of consumption {ct}∞t=0 and {µt}∞t=0, and use them
to equalize Eqs. (36) and (37). This allows is to solve for the time-varying τs,t
as,
τs,t = µt
(
1− c
−γ
t−1
Et(c
−γ
t+1)
)
. (38)
Additionally, we introduce an investment distortion that drives a wedge
between the social and private return to capital. We keep the form of this
wedge similar to Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) in the form,
c−γt = β(1− τs,t)(1− τk,t)Et(c−γt+1(αk˜α−1t+1 + 1− δ)). (39)
Taking the savings wedge as given in each period, along with the basic
model’s sequences {ct}∞t=0, {µt}∞t=0 , and {k˜t}∞t=0, we can calculate the invest-
ment wedges by setting Eq. (39) equal to the capital demand equation given
in Eq. (17) from our model. The time-varying investment wedge that results
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for each t is
τk,t = 1− 1
(1− τs,t)
(
1− µt + µt( c
−γ
t−1(αk˜
α−1
t−1 + 1− δ)
Et(c
−γ
t+1(αk˜
α−1
t+1 + 1− δ)
)
)
. (40)
If we assume that the individual agents of this economy take sequences {τs,t}∞t=0
and {τk,t}∞t=0 as given when choosing their optimal plans, the equilibrium out-
comes of the two models would be identical. The savings and investment
wedges that result from this exercise are depicted in Figure 11.
Figure 11: Saving and Investment Wedges, Small Open Economy Simulation
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The solid, black line depicts the savings wedge in Eq. (38) and the dashed, black line depicts
the investment wedge in Eq. (40).
Our model’s consumption growth is mainly driven by a savings wedge. The
time-varying saving wedge begins the simulation at zero, prior to the start of
convergence. In the first period, it is positive at around 0.03 and quickly turns
negative shortly after the start of convergence in the small open economy. The
wedge stays negative, slowly tending towards zero with the extrapolative share
of the forecast.
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A positive wedge at the start of technological generates a less than one-to-
one movement between the discounted future and current marginal utility of
consumption. This is due to the fact that after the start of convergence, con-
sumption actually falls relative to the initial consumption. The extrapolation
bias introduced in our model generates a lower marginal utility of consumption
during the first period of convergence and results in a positive τs,t. Thereafter
a negative τs,t indicates a subsidy on savings that operates by increasing the
expected future marginal utility of consumption.
In comparison to the savings wedge, the investment wedge is small in mag-
nitude, and approaches zero after 15 periods from the start of convergence.
Also slightly negative, the expectation formation tends to increase investment
by creating a higher return on capital investments relative to the marginal
product of labor. This stems from the fact that the expectation formation
increases the expected future marginal product of labor with a lower initial
capital stock (higher marginal product of capital).
8.3. Habit Formation
One might wonder if our results may be replicated using a more standard
model feature of habit formation. Until our exercise, this point remained
an open research question. In what follows, we include habit formation in the
model and show the simulation results. As will become apparent, the inclusion
of habit formation is not powerful enough to explain our stylized facts.
We keep the standard model introduced in Section 3, but include habit
formation in a non-separable form into the preferences of households.
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(ct − µ2ct−1)1−γ − 1
1− γ , (41)
where µ2 governs the strength of habits and will ultimately slow the growth
rate of consumption. We can see this from the consumption Euler equation,
(ct − µ2ct−1)−γ = β(1 + rt)(ct+1 − µ2ct)−γ. (42)
An unconstrained household cares about the marginal utility derived from
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consumption levels and consumption growth. In a converging economy con-
sumption growth will remain sticky due to the lower marginal utility that
households derive from large shifts in consumption.
We test the suitability of the habit formation model to our data using the
same estimation exercise as before, only with rational expectations assumption
and habit formation. Our estimation exercise results in an intensity of habit
parameter of µ2 = 0.999. The results of the quantitative exercise for carrying
over the parameters from the initial exercise are shown for the small open
economy and two large economy cases in Figures 12 and 19 in Appendix A,
respectively.
Figure 12: Quantitative Results Small Open Economy, Habit formation
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The solid, black line depicts the small open economy model results with habit formation
and rational expectations, with an estimated habit parameter, µ2 = 0.999. Simulated data
are in levels. The gray, dashed line depicts data for China from 1995 to 2011. All data are
in levels and filtered using Hodrick Prescott filter with smoothing parameter 100.
Figure 12 shows the data for China in the dashed gray line and the model’s
prediction with habit formation in solid black line. What becomes immedi-
ately clear is that, despite the high intensity of habits, the model is unable
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to replicate our stylized facts. While habit formation is important and very
successful in inducing persistence at business cycle frequencies, it does not al-
low model predictions to match systematic imbalances at lower frequencies, in
which households rationally anticipate the effects of their consumption habits
during the growth process. This suggests that learning plays a crucial role in
understanding persistent imbalances in the growth and development process.
Similar results hold for the two country model with habit formation. These
results are shown in Figure 19.
We next explore how our expectation distortion compares with the intensity
of habits. Solving Eq. (42) for µ2,t, we use the consumption path from our
simulation generated by Eq. (16) to calculate the following habit parameter
that would replicate this simulated data,
µ2,t =
(β(1 + rt))
−1/γct+1 − ct
(β(1 + rt))−1/γct − ct−1 . (43)
This time-varying intensity of habits parameter is that which justifies the
simulated consumption growth in our model with extrapolation bias intro-
duced in the expectation formation.
The path for the time varying habit parameter results from the non-
monotonic path for consumption shown in the second panel of Figure 13. The
initial habit parameter is positive around 0.40 immediately after the start of
technological convergence. This is due to a higher initial consumption prior
to the start of convergence. The habit parameter becomes very large, around
35, in the fourth period due to consumption reaching a minimum after the
start of convergence. Thereafter, the habit parameter stays very close but in
excess of unity and slowly converges towards zero as the balanced growth path
is attained.
8.4. Factor Income Distribution
Upon receiving news of convergence with rational expectations, even in an
economy closed to world capital markets, households should rely on future
economic growth to allow them to smooth consumption and therefore save
37
Figure 13: Time-varying Intensity of Habits
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In the left panel the solid, black line depicts the intensity of habits that would replicate the
consumption path generated by our model with extrapolative expectations for 30 periods
after the start of technological convergence. The habit parameter is calculated from Eq.
(43). The right panel depicts the path for consumption taken from our simulation of Eq.
(16).
less. Firms will increase investment, anticipating higher future marginal pro-
ductivity. Therefore, the capital to labor ratio will determine the impact of
convergence on the real wage.
In our baseline model of learning, both savings and investment will be in
excess of their rational expectations counterparts at the start of convergence.
If the savings channel dominates, the capital to labor ratio is higher in an
economy converging to the frontier due to excess savings of households. The
implications for factor incomes should be clear at this point. Real wages under
rational expectations would have risen less in China since the 1990s than our
model predicts. Therefore, the way expectations and learning takes place
in converging countries has major implications for the distribution of factor
income worldwide.
Figure 14 makes this point plain. It shows labor income per efficiency unit
and the marginal product of capital for the US and China during the first
50 years after Chinese convergence. Given a common productivity scenario
within each country for both model types, in the learning during convergence
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Figure 14: Factor Income during Convergence
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The solid, black line depicts the small open economy model predictions with rational ex-
pectations. The gray, dashed line shows the results for the small open economy model with
extrapolative expectations. Wage per Unit of Effective Labor is calculated from Eq. (25) as
wt = (1− α)y˜t, where y˜t is output per effective unit of labor.
case, real labor income is larger with learning than with rational expectations.
This has implications for the distribution of factor incomes in China during
its transition experience.
What is also interesting is that in the converging economy, the differential
effect of learning on real labor income seems to be quite large. Figure 15 depicts
the real labor income in China and the US for first 50 years of convergence
of the Chinese economy. In the Chinese case, real labor income is up to 10
percent higher with learning than under rational expectations. The differences
are instead negligible in the frontier economy.
9. Conclusion
Technological catch-up entails a huge transformation in the converging
countries’ standards of living, often long before the country will have con-
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Figure 15: Labor Income during Convergence
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The solid, black line depicts the small open economy model predictions with rational ex-
pectations for labor income in the United States (left panel) and China (right panel). The
gray, dashed line shows the results for the small open economy model with extrapolative
expectations. Labor income is calculated from Eq. (4) as wt = (1−α)yt, where y˜t is output
per unit of labor. Given the trend growth for TFP, along the balanced growth path, once
the economy converges, labor income will grow at a rate g∗.
verged to a balanced growth path. During this sometimes dramatic transition,
it is likely that agents in the economy fail to perfectly predict their and their
offspring’s future desire for consumption independently from their recent past
experience. We therefore claim that a past of starvation or hardship will make
a developing country’s average household wish to save more for the future,
simply because they may be incapable of imagining how close to satisfaction
they and their children will be. This relative lack of self awareness–certainly
conflicting with a textbook view of developing countries borrowing against an
optimistic future–may also be justified by the higher complexity of rational
expectations on an economy’s transition towards a more stationary environ-
ment. As they get closer to a more balanced growth path, they will learn to
trust the rational expectations view of the economy, and they will realize that
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so much saving is not necessary to guarantee an acceptable future.
This paper offers two simple theoretical and numerical examples of how
the excess savings of a country catching up–both to the balanced growth path
and to rational expectations modeling–could help to solve the allocation puzzle
which characterizes many developing countries, and to contribute to explain
important global imbalances, such as China’s massive net foreign asset accu-
mulation.
Quite remarkably in our two country world analysis, despite the US be-
ing assumed fully rational, the Chinese gradual catching up to fully rational
expectations may even explain the US debt over accumulation. In this sense,
our model gives an additional theoretical underpinning to the “savings glut
hypothesis" formulated by Bernanke (2005).
It is important to remark that in order to make our point clear, we have
operated under highly simplistic assumptions, most notably neglecting the
important investment and saving frictions that plague developing countries
(Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2013), as well as the process of financial development
and exchange rate liberalization gradually taking place in a country such as
China, highlighted by Caballero et al. (2008a,b) and Song et al. (2011, 2014).
Hence we view our contribution as complementary to the analyses of these
important issues.
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Figure 16: Small Open Economy Simulation of Productivity Convergence
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The top panel shows simulation results for 150 periods and the lower panel for 30 periods
after the start of convergence. Consumption, capital stock and GDP are measured in effi-
ciency units of labor. Trade Balance over GDP, current account over GDP and the interest
rate are measured in levels. The solid, black line depicts the model predictions with ratio-
nal expectations. The gray, dashed line shows the results for the model with extrapolative
expectations.
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Figure 17: United States: Two Country Simulation of Productivity Convergence
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The top panel shows simulation results for 150 periods and the lower panel for 30 periods
after the start of convergence. Consumption, capital stock and GDP are measured in effi-
ciency units of labor. Trade Balance over GDP, current account over GDP and the interest
rate are measured in levels. The solid, black line depicts the model predictions with ratio-
nal expectations. The gray, dashed line shows the results for the model with extrapolative
expectations.
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Figure 18: China: Two Country Simulation of Productivity Convergence
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The top panel shows simulation results for 150 periods and the lower panel for 30 periods
after the start of convergence. Consumption, capital stock and GDP are measured in effi-
ciency units of labor. Trade Balance over GDP, current account over GDP and the interest
rate are measured in levels. The solid, black line depicts the model predictions with ratio-
nal expectations. The gray, dashed line shows the results for the model with extrapolative
expectations.
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Appendix B
In Section 8 we test the generalizability of our results to the convergence
experience of other economies. Therefore, we conduct model simulation exer-
cises on a sample of converging economies.
From a total sample of 108 countries from PWT 8.1 with data available
from 1995 to 2011, we calculate per employment output and capital stock,
using (emp), real GDP (rgdpo) and capital stock (rkna). All variables are HP
filtered with smoothing parameter λ = 100.
With these variables, TFP is calculated using Eq. (18). For each country,
we calculate average productivity growth from 1995 to 2011 and the conver-
gence parameter p¯ii as the ratio of TFP level in the US to country i in 1980.
Finally, the speed of technological convergence (and learning) parameter, ψi
is found using the solution to Eq. (8).
We start with the sample of developing economies from Gourinchas and
Jeanne (2013). We include transitional economies of eastern Europe, with
data available during our sample period.
We are interested in explaining convergence to a balance growth path from
below. That is, we are interested in explaining capital flows for countries
beginning from a level below that of the productivity frontier. As such, we
exclude countries that are not converging during the period 1995 to 2011: that
is with ψ < 0 or p¯i < 1.
Finally, we observe several countries that are very distant from the pro-
ductivity frontier. As our model assumes perfectly functioning capital markets
and no official role for government aid, we exclude economies exhibiting con-
vergence parameters that exceed the 99th percentile. These countries are likely
not to have access to international capital markets and receive a large portion
of GDP in the form of official aid flows. This leaves us with a sample of 50
converging economies for which we carry out our simulation exercise.
We calculate the average capital inflows over the period 1995 to 2011 using
data from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). Capital inflows are taken to be
the negative of the current account measure in current US Dollars and GDP
in current US Dollars. Both series are smoothed using an HP filter with
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smoothing parameter, λ = 100.
The resulting data as well as the estimation results for average extrapola-
tion shares are listed below in Table 3.
Country p¯i ψ g (TFP) Avg. CA/Y µ¯
Albania 8.64 0.011 0.067 -0.081 0.259
Argentina 3.42 0.009 0.033 0.007 0.273
Armenia 10.64 0.007 0.060 -0.109 0.013
Azerbaijan 5.60 0.009 0.047 -0.017 0
Belarus 3.79 0.010 0.038 -0.053 0.167
Benin 24.767 0.001 0.030 -0.062 0.117
Bolivia 10.22 0.001 0.026 0.010 0.199
Botswana 4.21 0.010 0.040 0.073 0.471
Bulgaria 3.62 0.003 0.022 -0.073 0.122
China, People’s Republic 11.18 0.004 0.048 0.039 0.430
Congo 18.13 0.004 0.065 -0.028 0.264
Croatia 2.52 0.012 0.030 -0.051 0.077
Cyprus 1.80 0.001 0.017 -0.053 0.085
Dominican Republic 4.22 0.002 0.023 -0.030 0.119
Ecuador 8.19 0.005 0.044 -0.003 0.298
Egypt 4.09 0.002 0.021 0.005 0.218
Estonia 3.42 0.019 0.047 -0.070 0.103
Ethiopia 55.59 0.001 0.042 -0.041 0.245
Gabon 4.04 0.042 0.074 0.109 0.508
Ghana 15.08 0.001 0.031 -0.056 0.106
Hungary 2.67 0.008 0.027 -0.056 0.022
India 15.43 0.004 0.056 -0.010 0.350
Iran 5.20 0.032 0.077 0.051 0.439
Jordan 7.49 0.007 0.048 -0.044 0.316
Kazakhstan 5.71 0.015 0.059 -0.016 0.288
Latvia 3.65 0.013 0.041 -0.071 0.141
Lithuania 3.13 0.019 0.043 -0.069 0.062
Malawi 50.07 0.001 0.034 -0.104 0.046
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Malaysia 2.99 0.006 0.026 0.093 0.570
Mali 20.32 0.001 0.034 -0.082 0.006
Panama 2.51 0.005 0.023 -0.058 0.066
Peru 7.38 0.008 0.052 -0.023 0.216
Poland 3.00 0.018 0.041 -0.041 0.167
Republic of Korea 1.96 0.008 0.022 0.023 0.323
Republic of Moldova 12.83 0.003 0.041 -0.089 0.012
Romania 7.32 0.019 0.078 -0.066 0.259
Russian Federation 3.46 0.016 0.043 0.071 0.471
Rwanda 29.99 0.001 0.028 -0.045 0.167
Singapore 2.08 0.115 0.057 0.187 0.554
Slovakia 2.46 0.018 0.036 -0.053 0.095
Sri Lanka 5.27 0.002 0.024 -.0372 0.001
Thailand 6.49 0.001 0.021 0.023 0.323
Macedonia 4.04 0.009 0.037 -0.053 0.036
Turkey 1.86 0.024 0.031 -0.030 0.203
Turkmenistan 6.15 0.005 0.035 0.002 0.199
Uganda 25.33 0.001 0.031 -0.052 0.077
Ukraine 8.05 0.004 0.036 0.004 0.398
Tanzania 50.31 0.001 0.053 -0.078 0.098
Uzbekistan 6.08 0.005 0.035 0.030 0.372
Venezuela 4.37 0.016 0.052 0.072 0.480
Table 3: Variables for Cross Country Simulation
The table displays the key variables for our sample of 50 converging economies. The key
convergence parameters calculated directly from the data are initial distance from frontier,
p¯i, convergence speed parameter, ψ, growth rate of TFP, g¯ and average current account
over GDP from 1995 to 2011. The mean extrapolation share in the forecast, µ¯ is calculated
directly from the simulated series for time varying extrapolation share, µt, using estimated
parameters, µ0 and ρµ, as mean share of extrapolation bias for the first 20 years after start
of convergence.
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Figure 19: Quantitative Results China and the US, model with habit formation
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Simulated variables are in levels. The solid, black line depicts the two economy model results
with habit formation with a parameter of µ2 = 0.999 and rational expectations. The gray,
dashed line shows data for China and the US. Data are in levels and smoothed using the
Hodrick Prescott filter with parameter 100. 51
